BRODIE – Side Channel Related Project – DARPA (20 M)
The objective of this project is to expand upon findings in DARPA LADS program and improve electromagnetic side-channel analysis.
Dormant Hardware Trojan Detection Using Back-Scattering Side Channels – ONR (4.6M)
The objective of this project is to new detection system and techniques that will allow us to understand what are the limits of backscattering side-channels when used for detection of dormant hardware Trojans as well as test the possibility of hardware Trojan detection without golden sample.
Exploration of THz Backscattering as a Side-channel in Computer Systems – ONR, NSF (700K)
This project proposes a new non-functional property, Terahertz-frequency (THz) backscattering, which relies on measurements from outside the chip (no added circuitry on the chip) but, unlike other outside-the-chip methods that have been proposed before, provides much higher bandwidth and can be focused on only a part of the chip to be used for hardware Trojan detection.
Leveraging Analog signal Effects of EM propagation in modern computer systems – DARPA/I2O Leveraging the Analog Domain for Security (LADS) Program (9.4M)
CAMELIA monitors IoT devices by leveraging the involuntary electromagnetic emanations generated by computing devices. Our goal is to develop security monitoring hardware that can secure IoT devices while remaining physically separated from the monitoring hardware and that eliminates the on-device software issues and overhead inherent in traditional security monitors.
Spectral Profiling: Understanding Software Performance without Code Instrumentation – NSF HSF (850K)
Spectral profiling is completely novel approach to program profiling that can be used without any kind of instrumentation. More precisely, we are developing techniques and tools that leverage the electromagnetic (EM) emissions produced by a computer as it executes code to compute profiling information in an accurate and completely non-intrusive way.
Quantitative Analysis and Reporting of Potential Covert- and Side-Channel Attacks -AFSOR (993K)
We are conducting a systematic investigation of the relationship between software activity and covert- and side-channel signals, such as electromagnetic emanations, are leveraging our findings to define software analysis techniques that can identify activity that may result in information-carrying signals, and are integrating these analyses into a quantitative reporting framework that programmers can use both to identify code that may leak critical information and to suitably refactor such code in ways that reduce, or even completely eliminate, the identified information leakage.
Quantitative Analysis and Reporting of Electromagnetic Covert and Side Channel Vulnerabilities – NSF SaTC (500K)
This project is the first quantitative and systematic software analysis of EM (and possibly other) covert and side channel vulnerabilities. This work will lead to lower risk from future covert- and side-channel attacks, enable management of this risk, and enable future innovation at the intersection of program analysis and design, software/hardware interaction, and computer security.
Propagation Modeling and Measurements for THz Wireless Chip-to-Chip Communications – NSF CAREER (500K)
This project is the first to characterize the terahertz wireless communication channel within a system and between systems in a datacenter environment, or to design optimal multiplexing algorithms needed to achieve terabits-per-second data rates using compact but highly multiplexed MIMO systems.
Wireless channel measurements, modeling and prediction